Abstract:

Intellectual capital (IC) can be a source of competitive advantage for business and stimulate innovation that leads to wealth generation. This study investigates the association between the extent of IC disclosure (ICD) and the corporate governance attributes of listed banking companies in Bangladesh. Contrary to the notion of a knowledge-based sector like banking, this study adds to previous findings that demonstrate that Bangladeshi companies provide little in the way of ICD. The study confirms that board size and size of audit committee are important attributes to explain the IC disclosure (ICD) issues in Bangladesh. However, the study finds no significant association between ICD and other variables like number of independent directors to the board, frequency of board meeting, and ownership concentration.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Intellectual Capital; Disclosure; Banks; Bangladesh.

1. INTRODUCTION

An adequate disclosure regime is a common goal of all corporate governance systems. A sizeable body of the literature argues that the wave of accounting scandals can be attributed to the poor quality of corporate governance in overseeing the practice of financial reporting (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). The empirical research shows that good corporate governance reduces the information asymmetry between managers and owners (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007) and improves the levels of corporate disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Focusing on the importance of disclosures in
corporate governance, the Cadbury Committee stipulates that, an open approach to the disclosure of information contributes to the efficient working of the market economy, prompts boards to take effective action and allows shareholders and others to scrutinize companies more thoroughly (Cadbury, 1992, principles 3.2).

However, traditional financial reporting, based mostly on regulatory requirement, often proved inadequate for disclosing information about critical success factors, related performance indicators (Mouritsen, Larsen, & Bukh, 2001) and those value creation drivers not represented in financial statements (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). More specifically, traditional accounting reports do not have enough potential to show the true value established by intangibles in firms not to cover the gap between market and book value in many of today’s companies (Canibano, García-Auyso, & Sanchez, 2000; Maditinos, Chatzoudes, Tsairidis, & Theriou, 2011). Undoubtedly, emergence of knowledge based society and economy has shifted organizational value driver from tangible assets to intangibles, which is termed as intellectual capital (IC). A discourse then emerges, expressing an urgency to measure and manage these intangible and knowledge assets (Mouritsen & Roslender, 2009). In a consequence, companies are urged to improve their disclosure on intangible assets (Sriram, 2008; Vandemaele, Vergauwen, & Smits, 2005) and also explain the roles these assets play in their value-creation strategies (Bismuth & Tojo, 2008).

Generally, the term “IC” is used to refer to intangible assets or intangible business factors of the company, which have a significant impact on its performance and overall business success, although they are not explicitly listed in the balance sheet (if so, then under the term goodwill) (Mondol & Ghosh, 2012, p. 516). IC has been used interchangeably with intangibles, knowledge or knowledge resources. Various researchers have identified three components of intellectual capital (IC), namely, human capital (HC), structural capital, and relational capital (Bontis, 1999, 2001; Sveiby 1997). It is apparent from the voluminous number of edited publications (Bontis, 2002) that there is an influential body of opinion which advocates increased IC disclosure (Bontis, 2003) and lately, IC elements and related disclosures have been in the ascendant and this commensurate with the rise of the modern knowledge-based economy (Guthrie, Petty, Yongyanich, & Riccieri, 2001; Oliveras, Gouthorpe, Kasperskaya, & Perramon, 2008).

The research aims to answer the important questions of whether corporate governance affects firms’ decisions to voluntarily disclose intellectual capital information in the narratives of their annual reports. The study tests the association between corporate governance attributes and IC disclosure. Specifically, the study examines the impact of board size, board independence, audit committee, directors’ ownership, and board meetings on IC disclosure.

2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The study stems from an interest to observe impact of corporate governance attributes on ICD in the banking industry of Bangladesh. In recent years, financial institutions, especially those in the banking industry, have experienced a dynamic and competitive environment. With escalating global competition and its attendant rapid changes, banks have been increasingly providing superior product differentiation and value added services in order to remain competitive. Being aware of the inevitability of establishing sustainable competitive growth, the Bangladeshi banking sector has embraced a range of initiatives in a move towards knowledge-based resources. Raihan (2007) identified banks’ upgrading of business processes into automated systems, the constant striving for efficient manpower creation, enhanced employees knowledge and competence, improved networks and offering value added services as examples of the necessary changes within the Bangladeshi banking industry. The banking industry not only appeared as one of the most knowledge-intensive industries in Bangladesh but also as a prime mover of economic growth on which functions of other business organizations are dependent. In that aspect, value of IC disclosure in the banking industry in Bangladesh bears high significance.

During the last decade, focus on disclosure and corporate governance has increased gradually in the South Asian countries and most importantly, some local and regional professional bodies have taken some initiatives to set a benchmark on disclosure practices and to motivate companies to disclose company information fairly and accurately. For example, South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA) awards SAFA Best Presented Accounts Awards and Corporate Governance Disclosure Awards to the companies within the south Asian region for presentation of accounts and corporate disclosures. Most importantly, in 2009, Prime Bank Limited, a Bangladeshi Commercial Bank achieved the winner award in the banking sector. In Bangladesh, the prime regulator of stock market, that is, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also felt urgency of ensuring the integrity of financial control system existing in the listed companies through BSEC Notification 2012. The Bangladesh Bank’s prudential regulations for Banks on ‘Corporate Governance in Bank Management’ states that, “The board shall have its analytical review incorporated in the Annual Report as regard the success/failure in achieving the business and other targets as set out in its annual work-plan and shall apprise the shareholders of its opinions/recommendations on future plans and strategies. It shall set the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the CEO and other senior executives and have it evaluated at times”.

However, non-compliance and non-disclosure are common findings of many studies in LDCs including Bangladesh (Perera, 1975; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Larson & Kenny, 1995; Mir & Rahaman, 2005; Belal & Owen, 2007). Previous researches also shown that
the ownership structure of the large stock exchange listed companies is dominated by families Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI, 2004), not unlike other LDCs (Dyball & Valcarcel, 1999). Family and kinship ties are deeply rooted in Bangladesh’s political and economic history. A family business is more like a household, where disclosure is seen as revealing the family’s secrets. Uddin and Chowdhury (2008) argue that, it is not surprising that family-controlled companies inhibit accountability and transparency, because this is about revealing family secrets. That’s why, while the financial disclosure requirements and auditing standards set out by the BSEC for listed companies are quite comprehensive, actual compliance is highly questionable. Undoubtedly, intellectual capital disclosure (ICD), which is voluntary in nature, in the listed companies in Bangladesh largely, depends on corporate governance attributes or the characteristics of the family controlled board of directors.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Intellectual capital disclosure is a voluntary disclosure. There is no universally accepted regulation or guideline on intellectual capital disclosure (Rahim, Atan, & Kamaluddin, 2001). Voluntary disclosure in annual report has always been seen to reflect good corporate governance because it represents a company’s effort to promote transparency by provision of relevant information as much as possible to users (Campbell & Rahman, 2010). The corporate governance literature provides some evidence that low disclosure of intellectual capital information is an indication of weak governance practices in the governing reporting process (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).

Apart from corporate governance literature, a number of empirical studies were conducted to investigate ICD practices worldwide (e.g. Guthrie & Petty, 2000 in Australia; Brennan, 2001 in Ireland; April, Bosma, & Deglon, 2003 in South Africa; Bozzolan, O’Regan, & Ricceri, 2003 in Italy; Goh & Lim, 2004 in Malaysia; Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005 in Sri Lanka; Guthrie, Petty, & Recceri, 2006 in Hong Kong and Australia; Kamath, 2008 in India; Yi & Davey, 2010 in China; Nurunnabi, Hossain, & Hossain, 2011 in Bangladesh). Features of prior researches on ICD are that, these researches mainly focused on the developed countries, with a minority of studies of developing economies and the majority of ICD studies have employed a content analysis methodology (Nurunnabi, Hossain, & Hossain, 2011, p. 200).

Another development in the ICD literature is the incorporation of theoretical reasoning and investigation of firm-specific factors to explain why companies do voluntarily disclose IC (Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2006; Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008). Some studies (e.g., Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2006; Bruggen, Vergauwen, & Dao, 2009) find that,
firm size and industry are significant explanatory variables of ICD. Tayib and Salman (2011) demonstrated that as a company discloses its intellectual resources becomes competitive and earns trust of investors and creditors. Al-Musalli and Ismail (2012) conducted a study to analyze the relationship between intellectual capital performance and corporate governance attributes on 147 banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (CGC) for the period 2008 to 2010. They found that, except independent directors (negative relationship with IC disclosure), other variables are not associated with intellectual capital performance. Falikhatun, Aryani, and Prabow (2010) investigated the effects of corporate governance on the intellectual capital disclosure on a sample of 36 banks in Indonesia from a period of 2004 to 2008. They found that some corporate governance attributes (Board size, Independent directors, and Ownership structure) do not affect IC disclosure, while management ownership negatively affects IC disclosure. Nurunnabi, Hossain, and Hossain (2011) confirm that size and industry are important attributes to explain the IC disclosure (ICD) issues in Bangladesh.

The above literature reveals that intellectual capital disclosure is affected by various corporate attributes. Explanatory factors that are tested for influence on ICD include industry, firm size, leverage, profitability or financial performance, auditor type, listing age or firm age and corporate governance variables such as board composition or independence, ownership structure or concentration, audit committee size, frequency of audit committee meetings and chief executive officer (CEO) role duality etc. Given the emphases of the extant literature, the research questions for the present study are:

**RQ1:** To what extent are listed banking companies in Bangladesh pursuing ICD in their annual reports during the period 2013-2015?

**RQ2:** What are the corporate governance attributes that significantly influence ICD in Bangladesh?

### 4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Organizations undertake voluntary disclosures for the following key reasons. Technology-based or knowledge-intensive industry like bank will engage in more ICD than industries that rely mainly on physical assets to be profitable. This relationship can be explained by the following theories:

#### 4.1 Agency Theory

The theory explains that, managers are the agents of shareholders and adequate disclosure will provide a means of achieving the optimal contract (Aljifri, 2008). The theory assumes that the agency cost will vary with corporate attributes and by disclosing more; the managers will reduce the agency cost of ensuring trustworthiness
to the shareholders. Some support for the agency theory exists based on prior studies linking corporate governance features to voluntary disclosure (Gul & Leung, 2004).

4.2 Stakeholders Theory
Stakeholder theory purports that stakeholders have a right to be provided with information about how the company’s activities affect them (Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich, & Ricceri, 2004). In knowledge-intensive industries, IC assets appear to be the organization’s value driver. Since, IC assets are invisible in mandated disclosure, in order to satisfy the stakeholders’ need for information and to balance conflicting demands of stakeholders, firms in technology-based or knowledge-intensive industries will engage in voluntary disclosures about their IC (Yau, Chun, & Balaraman, 2009).

4.3 Legitimacy theory
Under legitimacy theory, “a company would voluntarily report on activities if management perceived that the particular activities were expected by the communities in which it operates” (Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich, & Ricceri, 2004, p. 284). Legitimating is concerned with building, maintaining and repairing the social contract between the organization and society (Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003). Legitimacy theory overlaps with stakeholder theory (Deegan, 2009). Both view organizations as embedded in a wider societal system, interacting with, affecting and being affected by others within that system.

4.4 Signaling theory
Signaling theory, by contrast, suggests that to minimize the information gap between a company and its stakeholders, it will need to supply the most credible or widely accepted information of its operations that it possibly can (Spence, 1973). The theory assumes that the disclosure of information is a reaction to informational asymmetry in markets and the signal of the company would be critical in terms of attracting potential and prospective investors and creditors (Morris, 1987).

4.5 Media Agenda-Setting Theory
According to this theory, management can respond to media-focused community concerns by way of voluntary disclosure in their corporate annual accounts. Alternatively, Sujan and Abeysekera (2007) argue that corporate annual reports are an important form of media and through them firms can bring attention to what they believe stakeholders should view as important.
5. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

5.1 IC Framework

Content analysis method is used to measure the extent of ICD in annual reports. While each company’s entire annual report was analyzed, the Chairman’s Report and Managing Directors’ Report were the predominant areas where IC was disclosed. To measure ICD, the study uses disclosure index comprising items of IC developed by Nurunnabi, Hossain, and Hossain (2011) (Appendix- 1). Main reason for choosing the disclosure index is that, it covers 63 IC items proposed by previous researchers. Moreover, the index has previously been used to measure ICD in the context of Bangladesh. The disclosure index contains 11 internal (structural) capital (IC) items, 19 external (relational) capital (EC) items and 33 human (employee) capital (HC) items. To assess the extent of voluntary disclosure, a scoring sheet was developed where if the company disclosed the information on IC it will receive a score of 1 to 3, or 0 in the event of an absence of disclosure. The disclosure model for the weighted disclosure thus measures the total disclosure score (TDS) for a company as follows:

\[ ICD = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{63} d_i}{m} \]

Where,

\( d_i = 1 \) or 2 or 3 if the item \( d_i \) is disclosed
\( d_i = 1 \) for disclosures in qualitative terms, or
\( d_i = 2 \) for disclosures in quantitative terms, or
\( d_i = 3 \) for disclosures in both qualitative and quantitative terms
0 if the item \( d_i \) is not disclosed.

\( m = \) Total weighted number of items a company may disclose = 189

5.2 Board size and IC disclosure

A board size refers to the number of directors serving in the board of directors (Jensen & Mecking, 1976). Determining an optimum size of the board of directors is a debatable matter. Many studies prefer that larger board enhance firm performance (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Klein, 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) while some studies have suggested smaller boards are better for improving firm performance (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Some studies found negative relationship between board size and performance (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). So, the literatures have
revealed mixed results regarding relationships between board size and firm performance.

According to resource dependency theory, larger boards are more likely to include increased pool of expertise that will enhance boards’ information processing capabilities. Furthermore, larger boards are more likely to increase firm’s ability to obtain and secure critical resources from their environment such as IC resources (Abeysekera, 2010). However, studies which investigate the relationship between board size and IC performance produce inconclusive results (Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009; Ho & Williams, 2003). So, based on the resource dependency theory, we can develop the following hypothesis:

**H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and IC disclosure.**

### 5.3 Independent directors and IC disclosure

The mix of executive and non-executive directors constituting a firm’s board is very important for its performance. Independent directors may act as “professional referees” to ensure that competition among executive directors stimulates actions consistent with shareholder value maximization (Fama, 1980).

Several studies suggest that independent directors provide positive support for managerial long term long-term oriented decisions that enhance long term performance (Ibrahim, Howard, & Angelidis, 2003). So, it is reasonable to expect that by giving advice and counsel independent directors are more likely to support IC related activities such as investing in human resources, R & D activities and information technology (Al-Musalli & Ismail, 2012). From the above references, we can develop the following hypothesis:

**H2: There is a positive relationship between number of independent directors and IC disclosure.**

### 5.4 Audit committee size and IC disclosure

The main role of audit committee is to improve the quality of firm’s financial reporting (Pincus Rubarsky, & Wong. 1989) and to monitor financial performance (Weir, Laing, & Mckinght 2002). Some authors argued that large audit committee size provides more skilled members serving on the committee which leads to improve the firm reporting (Sunday 2008). However, some previous studies indicate that small audit committee size improves the firm’s performance because large audit committee size may reduce the cooperation in the committee (Lin, Xiao, & Tang 2008).

A number of studies have examined the link between audit committee size and intellectual disclosure (Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008; Li, Mangena, & Pike 2012). Li,
Mangena, & Pike (2012) found size of audit committee has significant and positive relationship with intellectual capital disclosure among UK listed companies. Hence, the authors have suggested the second hypothesis as follows:

**H3:** There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and IC disclosure.

### 5.5 Ownership structure and IC disclosure

More closely held firms display less information asymmetry as the dominant shareholders typically have access to the information they require through private meetings. Li Pike, & Haniffa (2008, p. 140) argue that this is particularly applicable to ICD “because fund managers have access to such information via private communication channels”. Therefore, it follows that ICD would increase in association with the level of outside owners of the firm (Chau & Gray, 2002). From the above references, we can develop the following hypothesis:

**H4:** There is a negative association between levels of ownership concentration and extent of voluntary ICD.

### 5.6 Frequency of board meetings and IC disclosure

Effectiveness of a board depends on how often the board members meet to discuss the various issues facing a firm (Vefeas, 1999). The complexity of banking business enhances the necessity of frequent board meetings. Frequency of board meetings measures the intensity of board activity and the effectiveness of its monitoring (Vefeas, 1999; Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1998). Vafeas (1999), Brick and Chidambaram (2007) showed that the more of the frequency of board meetings held, it will increase the company’s performance. It is expected that board meeting frequency assists directors to monitor IC performance and consolidate synergy for strategic directions. Based on the above references, the following hypothesis can be developed:

**H5:** There is a positive relationship between frequency of board meetings and IC disclosure.

### 6. RESEARCH DESIGN

#### 6.1 Research Model
Note: CG = Corporate Governance; BS = Board Size; ID = Independent Directors; MAC = Audit Committee Size; BSH = Ownership Structure; NBM = Frequency of Board Meeting.

Figure 1: The conceptual model developed on the previous literature

6.2 The Sample Size
The study is carried out on the IC disclosure practices of listed banks in Bangladesh. The sample frame of the study consists of all listed banks (30 banks) in Bangladesh. Specifically, the sample covers the annual reports of companies listed on the DSE for the year 2013-2015.

At present, banks in Bangladesh are primarily of two types, namely, Scheduled Banks (get license to operate under Banking Companies Act, 1991 (Amended up to 2013) and Non-Scheduled Banks (established for special and definite objective and operate under the acts that are enacted for meeting up those objectives). The banking industry can be classified as follows:

Table 1: Types of Banks in Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Scheduled banks</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Owned Commercial Banks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fully or majorly owned by the Government of Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(SOCBs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialized Banks (SDBs)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Established for specific objectives like agricultural or industrial development. These banks are also fully or majorly owned by the Government of Bangladesh.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Private Commercial Banks (PCBs)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Majorly owned by the private entities and perform the banking functions in conventional fashion i.e. interest based operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islami Shariah based PCBs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Majorly owned by the private entities and execute banking activities according to IslamiShariah based principles i.e. Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS) mode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Operating in Bangladesh as the branches of the banks which are incorporated in abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from these banks, there are 4 non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh namely, Ansar VDP Unnayan Bank, Karmashangosthan Bank, ProbashiKollyan Bank, Jubilee Bank.

Source: Compiled from Bangladesh Bank website: [https://www.bb.org.bd/fnansys/bankfi.php](https://www.bb.org.bd/fnansys/bankfi.php), retrieved on 2 February, 2017

6.3 Regression Model

The researchers have used regression analysis to test the relation between the board characteristics and intellectual disclosure of the firms. The assumptions underlying the regression model were tested for multicollinearity based on the correlation matrix as well as the variance inflation factor (VIF)

\[ ICD = \alpha + \beta_1 BS + \beta_2 ID + \beta_3 MAC + \beta_4 BSH + \beta_5 NBM + \epsilon \]

Where,

**Independent Variables: Corporate Governance Attributes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BS= Board Size</th>
<th>Total number of directors on the board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID= Independent Directors (Board Independence)</td>
<td>Number of Independent Directors in the Board. This satisfies the definition of an independent director as provided in the BSEC Notification 2012.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact Of Corporate Governance Attributes On Intellectual Capital Disclosure: Evidence From Listed Banking Companies In Bangladesh

MAC = Members of Audit Committee
Total number of audit committee members.

BSH = Board Shareholdings
Percentage of share capital held by the directors

NBM = Number of Board Meeting during the year
The number of regular meetings held by the board of directors during each year. The meetings refer to those held in person, excluding the telephonic meetings.

Dependent Variable: Performance Indicator

| Intellectual Capital Disclosure (ICD) | Checklist containing 63 items developed by Nurunnabi, Hossain, and Hossain (2011) |

7. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

7.1 Descriptive Analysis

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. The average level of voluntary ICD in the sample companies is 16.32 percent, with a maximum of 28.0 percent and a minimum of 7 percent. This level of disclosure reveals a relatively poor disclosure regime in Bangladesh which is similar to the findings of Nurunnabi, Hossain, and Hossain (2011). Regarding the independent variables, the average board size is approximately 14 directors, ranging from a minimum of 5 directors to a maximum of 24 directors. As per BSEC Notification No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/134/Admin/44 dated August, 2012, listed companies in Bangladesh should have a board size in between 5-20; whereas, the Banking Companies Act 1991 (Amended in 2013) requires board size to be maximum of 20 directors including 3 independent directors. At present, all the banks comply with the legal and regulatory requirements. Table 3 also reveals that the average number of independent directors to the board is 1.73 with maximum 4 members and minimum 0. Further scrutiny reveals that, 4 sample banks failed to comply the requirements legal and regulatory requirement regarding IDs. As regards to size of audit committee, the study finds that, on an average, there are 4.26 members in the Audit Committee to the board with maximum 6 members and minimum 3 members. But the focal point is that some companies do not comply minimum ID requirement. The average frequency of board meeting is 17.76 times per fiscal year with minimum 7 times and maximum 31 times and the average attendance of board of directors are 72.92% in the board meetings. It appears that banking and financial sector entails much more regular board meetings due to nature of business. The percentage of inside ownership has a mean value of 36.94% with SD 19.33%. There is high difference between the minimum, which is 4.63% and the maximum of 90.19%. This implies that board directors in some companies may
own more than 50% of shares in the firm attributing them the majority of the ownership.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.99</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBM</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSH</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85.56</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>90.19</td>
<td>36.94</td>
<td>19.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.1632</td>
<td>.04403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2 Correlation Analysis

Table 3 summarizes the correlation between dependent variables (ICD) and independent variables (Board size, Independent directors, Members of Audit Committee, Frequency of board meetings, Board shareholdings and Board sub-committees). The table displays that dependent variable ICD is significantly correlated with independent variables – board size (BS) and number of audit committee members (MAC).

Table 3: Correlation Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BS</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>MAC</th>
<th>NBM</th>
<th>BSH</th>
<th>ICD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>.275**</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>-0.418**</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBM</td>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the table also represents the correlation between the independent variables each other. It shows that board size is positively correlated with audit committee size, which means that the size of the board of directors play a significant role in determining the members of audit committee. A significantly negative correlation exists between audit committee size and the board shareholdings. The BSEC Notification No. SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/134/Admin/44 dated August, 2012 emphasized on board independence focusing on having adequate number of independent directors to the board. The Notification requires that, at least one fifth (1/5) of the total number of directors in the company’s board shall be independent directors (ID). The Notification also requires that, the audit committee to the board shall be composed of at least 3 (three) members including at least 1 (one) ID. Moreover, chairman of the audit committee shall be an ID, who shall remain present in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). However, it is interesting that no relationship has been found between independent directors and other corporate governance attributes.

7.3 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis

The models are regressed using linear regression analysis by the SPSS and the results are presented in Table 4. In total, 36.3 per cent of the variation in ICD (adjusted R²) was explained by the five independent variables. Examination of the five independent variables showed that, board size (BS) and audit committee size (MAC) has a statistically significant positive associations with overall ICD (p = 0.000 and 0.033 respectively). However, other test variables, number of IDs in the board (ID) and number of board meeting (NBM) are not positively significant at 5 percent level. This implies that having a higher proportion of outside independent directors (ID) on board does not influence IC disclosures, thus rejecting H2. These results also confirmed the correlation analysis results. The boards of directors in most of the listed companies in Bangladesh comprise very close family members. The boards play a significant part in serving the interests of families rather than those of general shareholders (Uddin & Chowdhury 2008, p 1026). It is not surprising that family-controlled companies inhibit accountability and transparency, because this is about revealing family secrets. That’s why, the research hypothesized that, board shareholding (BSH) is negatively associated
with ICD. However, regression analysis did not show any significant impact of BSH on ICD, thus rejecting H4.

### 7.4 Test for Multi Co-linearity and Autocorrelation

The multi co-linearity is a phenomenon where two or more variables are highly correlated. High degree of multi co-linearity indicated bias relation between two variables and it may affect accuracy of multi regression test results. The problem exists if independent variables are highly correlated at each other with correlation exceeding 0.90 according to Tabachnick and Fidel (2007). Multi co-linearity can also be examined by tolerance and VIF test. Myers (1990) suggested that a VIF value of 10 and tolerance level greater than (> ) 1 are causes for concern. The multi co-linearity statistics of the independent variables of this study is presented in Table-4.

It is seen that, none of the independent variables has a tolerance value in excess of 1.0 and a VIF value in excess of 10. So, in this study, multi co-linearity is not a problem in interpreting the regression results. Moreover, Durbin-Watson test value in these models are 1.986(see Table 4), which confirms the absence of autocorrelation.

**Table 4: Impact of Corporate Governance Attributes on ICD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>5.764*</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>2.165*</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBM</td>
<td>-.902</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSH</td>
<td>.920</td>
<td>.360</td>
<td>.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F stat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000*</td>
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8. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Intellectual capital can be a source of competitive advantage for business and stimulate innovation that leads to wealth generation. This study investigates the association between the extent of ICD and the corporate governance attributes of listed banking companies in Bangladesh. There are many driving forces, such as globalization, the increased use of information technology, the recent announcement of “Digital Bangladesh” and the consistent growth of the capital markets, which are pushing Bangladesh towards knowledge based economy status. The banking industry not only appeared as one of the most knowledge-intensive industries in Bangladesh but also as a prime mover of economic growth on which functions of other business organizations are dependent. However, contrary to the notion of a knowledge based sector, this study adds to previous findings that demonstrate that Bangladeshi companies provide little in the way of ICD. The reasons for such poor disclosure may be due to the absence of any clear set of legislative guidelines including the Companies Act 1994. Although there are some legal provisions on intellectual property including the Patents, Design and Trade Marks Act 1883 (later the Patents and Design Act 1911) and the Trade Marks Act 1940, there is no copyright guideline and the Stock Exchange Listing Requirements also do not require companies to make ICDs. It may be argued that most of the companies in Bangladesh are family owned in which, management does not have much motivation to disclose voluntary information on their stocks of IC in their annual reports. Therefore, regulation might be an option for the policy makers in Bangladesh.

The study confirms that board size and size of audit committee are important attributes to explain the IC disclosure (ICD) issues in Bangladesh. However, the study finds no significant association between ICD and other variables like number of IDs, frequency of board meeting, and ownership structure. The study is limited to only one sector of the knowledge economy companies and only for the years 2013-2015. This study investigated the effect of five corporate governance attributes on ICD. Further research can be done using other firm specific features like industry type, leverage, firm size, listing age, auditor type etc. The study is also limited of using content analysis as a research tool, tied with varied nature of corporate cultures and regulatory framework. There are various ways to measure IC performance such as VAIC which gives more acceptable disclosure of intellectual resources. A comparative analysis could be
performed between Bangladesh and other developing nation, or with a developed nation in this respect.

References


impact of corporate governance attributes on intellectual capital disclosure: evidence from listed banking companies in bangladesh


**APPENDIX – A**

**IC Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Capital</th>
<th>Relational Capital</th>
<th>Human Capital</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Philosophy</td>
<td>Brands</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Culture</td>
<td>Customers</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Process</td>
<td>Customer Satisfaction &amp; Loyalty</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Systems</td>
<td>Company reputation</td>
<td>Work-related knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>Distribution Channels</td>
<td>Innovativeness of employees/ Teams of employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial relations</td>
<td>Business Collaboration</td>
<td>Vocational qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copyright</td>
<td>Favorable Contracts</td>
<td>Know-how</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patents</td>
<td>Licensing agreements</td>
<td>Work-related competencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trademark</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial spirit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Innovative Product</td>
<td>Franchising agreement</td>
<td>An attractive place to work</td>
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<td>Product Focused</td>
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<td>Total =11 Items</td>
<td>Financial Contracts</td>
<td>The work is engaging</td>
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<td>Market share</td>
<td>Long term career</td>
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<td>Creates values</td>
<td>Career &amp; Development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beating the Competition</td>
<td>New generation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive Customer Experience</td>
<td>Looking for retire</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technology helping customers</td>
<td>Race</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing knowledge externally</td>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>I can see the customer</td>
<td>Religion</td>
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<td>Employee safety</td>
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<td>Trade Union activity</td>
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<td>Employees thanked</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Employees features in AR</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employee involvement with community</td>
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<td>Employee and Executive compensation plans</td>
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<td>Employee benefits</td>
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<td>Employee share and option ownership plans</td>
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<td>Age of Employees</td>
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